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The Role of Cash Transfers in Social Protection, Humanitarian Response 
and Shock-Responsive Social Protection 
Keetie Roelen, Daniel Longhurst and Rachel Sabates-Wheeler 
 
Summary 
Cash transfers have expanded rapidly in low- and middle-income countries (LMICs) around 
the world in the past decade. The contexts in which they are implemented have also 
diversified; while cash transfers were mostly adopted initially as central elements of social 
protection systems, they have become increasingly popular as a core component of 
humanitarian response. They also play a crucial role in emerging systems of ‘shock-
responsive social protection’ (SRSP), which denotes systems that have the ability to scale 
assistance up and down following a shock – either by increasing the level of assistance for 
existing beneficiaries or by expanding coverage temporarily to non-beneficiaries affected by 
the shock.  
 
This paper provides an overview of the use of cash transfers in three different settings, 
namely: (1) cash transfers as long-term support within social protection systems; (2) cash 
transfers as immediate and short-term support as part of humanitarian assistance; and      
(3) cash transfers as a key component in scaling up social protection provision and coverage 
in the event of large-scale emergencies, or smaller-scale, household- and community-level 
shocks – also referred to as SRSP. Within each of these settings, the paper provides an 
overview of objectives, modality options, targeting mechanisms, delivery options and main 
international players promoting or supporting cash transfers. The paper also offers reflection 
on the efforts to harmonise cash transfers across the social protection and humanitarian 
spheres within the remit of SRSP. 
 
Keywords: cash transfers; cash-based transfers; humanitarian assistance; social protection; 
shock-responsive social protection. 
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1  Introduction 
Cash transfers are payments provided by either government or non-governmental 
organisations (NGOs), and are often targeted at the poorest and most vulnerable in society. 
In the past decade, implementation of cash transfer programmes has expanded rapidly in 
low- and middle-income countries (LMICs) around the world, both in terms of the number of 
programmes and the number of people covered by them. The contexts in which they are 
implemented have also diversified; while early cash transfers were mostly adopted as central 
elements of social protection systems, they have become increasingly popular as a core 
component of humanitarian response. They also play a crucial role in emerging systems of 
‘shock-responsive social protection’ (SRSP), which denotes systems that have the ability to 
scale assistance up and down following a shock – either by increasing the level of 
assistance for existing beneficiaries or by expanding coverage temporarily to non-
beneficiaries affected by the shock.  
 
The use of cash transfers across contexts means that they may serve different objectives, 
involve different actors, and employ distinct implementation mechanisms within their 
respective contexts, giving rise to confusion and misunderstandings in cross-sectoral 
collaboration. This is particularly problematic as caseloads for and implementation of cash 
transfers in different contexts may overlap. Cherrier (2014) outlines four scenarios in which 
such overlap may take place, namely:  
 
1. Vertical expansion of a national cash transfer programme, consisting of an increase in 
the value or duration of transfers for those already benefiting from the programme and 
affected by a crisis. 
2. Horizontal expansion of a national cash transfer programme, consisting of a scale-up 
of a programme and including new beneficiaries that are affected by a crisis but not yet 
included. 
3. Use of cash transfer administrative framework, in order to use available information to 
reach those most affected by a crisis within the existing group of beneficiaries. 
4. Alignment of parallel humanitarian cash-based support, consisting of the integration of 
cash-based transfers used in humanitarian settings in long-term development planning 
in contexts where no national cash transfer programmes are yet available.  
 
This Working Paper aims to support cross-sectoral collaboration and to facilitate linkages 
between those working on cash transfers in social protection and humanitarian settings by 
providing an overview of the use of cash transfers in three different settings, namely: (a) cash 
transfers as long-term support within social protection systems, (b) cash transfers as 
immediate and short-term support as part of humanitarian assistance, and (c) cash transfers 
as a key component to scaling up social protection provision and coverage in the event of 
large-scale emergencies, or smaller-scale household- and community-level shocks – also 
referred to as SRSP. Within each of these settings, we consider objectives, modality options, 
targeting mechanisms, delivery options, and main international players promoting or 
supporting cash transfers (among others). Following this overview, we reflect on the efforts 
to harmonise cash transfers across the social protection and humanitarian spheres within 
the remit of SRSP. 
 
 
2  Overview 
Table 2.1 provides an overview of the use of cash transfers across three contexts and 
portrays some of the traditional roles played by different forms of cash-based support. 
Sections 3, 4 and 5 elaborate on the use of cash transfers in each of the three settings. 
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In reading the table and discussion below, it should be noted that social protection and 
humanitarian responses operate as systems, with cash transfers representing only one 
option among a range of interventions (most notably food transfers). SRSP is typically built 
on existing social protection systems by including, or harmonising with, some aspects of 
humanitarian response. Cash transfers necessarily represent one type of intervention within 
SRSP as it utilises existing social protection systems and modalities as much as possible. 
 
We should also point out that different terminologies are used to denote similar interventions 
across contexts. While cash-based support is most commonly referred to as ‘cash transfers’ 
within social protection discussions, the terms ‘cash-based transfers’ and ‘cash-based 
interventions’ are more prevalent in humanitarian settings. Similarly, transfers that have 
multiple objectives and often include additional components (such as linkages to services or 
in-kind support) are denoted as ‘multi-purpose cash grants’ in humanitarian contexts but 
‘cash plus’ in social protection settings.1 
 
Table 2.1 Overview of cash transfers in three contexts 
 Cash transfers as long-term 
support 
Cash transfers as 
humanitarian response 
 
Cash transfers as part of 
shock-responsive social 
protection (SRSP) 
Objective Provide regular and long-term 
basic income support to 
protect those living in poverty 
or in need, to improve food 
security, health, education 
and livelihoods outcomes, 
among others. 
Provide timely life-saving and 
livelihoods support in response 
to conflicts or natural disasters; 
rights-based approach for 
people affected by emergencies 
regardless of social or economic 
background. 
Provide time-delimited 
consumption support in times of 
acute need and emergency by 
(a) topping up regular support 
for existing cash transfer 
beneficiaries, (b) expanding 
coverage to food-insecure 
households not currently served 
by a social protection 
programme, and (c) providing 
household support for small-
scale idiosyncratic shocks. 
Modalities Regular and direct cash 
payments in the form of: 
 unconditional transfers; 
 conditional transfers; 
 public works 
programmes; 
 ‘cash-plus’ programmes; 
 voucher schemes (as a 
proxy for cash). 
Dependent on sector and 
context but typically comprises 
food followed by cash transfers 
to meet some or all of basic 
subsistence needs, as well as 
non-food items for water and 
sanitation, agriculture, shelter, 
education, medication, and 
veterinary services, among 
others. 
Primarily unconditional cash 
transfers, but could also include 
food transfers if the social 
protection system is set up to 
deliver food. 
Targeting One or more targeting 
mechanisms:  
 geographical targeting 
 categorical targeting 
 proxy means-testing 
 means-testing 
 community-based 
targeting 
 self-targeting. 
Mechanisms used most 
commonly after a shock include 
geographic targeting followed by 
community-based targeting. 
Primarily needs based, 
determined by national-level 
indicators of shocks such as 
drought and rainfall or local-level 
knowledge of community-
specific shocks. Targeting uses 
existing mechanisms and 
infrastructure within national-
level social protection systems. 
Where expansion of coverage is 
required and the population has 
not been pre-identified as 
vulnerable, rapid geographic 
and community-based targeting 
is the typical method used. 
(Cont’d.) 
                                                          
1  The Cash Learning Partnership (CaLP) website has a glossary of terms used in relation to cash-based support in both 
humanitarian and social protection settings: www.cashlearning.org/resources/glossary  
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Table 2.1 (Cont’d.) 
 Cash transfers as long-term 
support 
Cash transfers as 
humanitarian response 
 
Cash transfers as part of 
shock-responsive social 
protection (SRSP) 
Delivery Modes of delivery can range 
from physical payment at 
regular (e.g. monthly) intervals 
in central locations to 
technologically supported 
delivery. Transfers may also 
be delivered in the form of 
vouchers as a proxy for cash. 
There is a general shift from 
physical face-to-face 
payments towards 
technologically advanced 
methods such as use of smart 
cards or mobile phones. 
 
Transfer sizes are generally 
based on a combination of 
needs-based and budget-
based considerations. 
Monetary assistance in the form 
of physical cash, paper 
vouchers, or through other 
delivery mechanisms such as 
bank transfers and electronic 
platforms such as smart cards or 
mobile money.  
Delivery typically occurs through 
a combination of partners (e.g. 
NGO or local government plus 
service provider), or solely 
through one service provider 
(e.g. G4S, bank or mobile 
network company). 
 
Transfer sizes mostly needs- or 
rights-based and driven by 
international standards such as 
Sphere Standards and the 
Survival Minimum Expenditure 
Basket (SMEB). 
Delivery typically occurs through 
existing mechanisms within 
social protection system, such 
as physical payment or mobile 
money. Humanitarian relief can 
be channelled through 
institutional mechanisms within 
the social protection sector, such 
as contingency funds, and 
various risk financing 
mechanisms.  
Main 
players 
Mostly government-led at 
national level. International 
stakeholders include the Food 
and Agriculture Organization 
of the United Nations (FAO), 
the International Labour 
Organization (ILO), UNICEF 
(the United Nations Children’s 
Fund) and the World Bank. 
Mixture of government and 
international actor-led (though 
generally international-led). 
Within government, disaster risk 
management (DRM) department 
often leads coordination of other 
departments and international 
actors, and co-chairs cluster 
meetings. 
Main international actors include 
United Nations (UN) agencies 
(e.g. the United Nations High 
Commissioner for Refugees 
(UNHCR), the World Food 
Programme (WFP), UNICEF), 
international NGOs (e.g. Save 
the Children, CARE, GOAL), the 
International Red Cross and Red 
Crescent Movement / 
International Committee of the 
Red Cross (ICRC), and faith-
based groups. Local NGOs and 
civil society also play an 
important role. 
Mixture of government and 
international actors. Where a 
SRSP system is well-
established, the government will 
take prime responsibility. The 
social protection and DRM 
sectors are required to work 
together; the social protection 
sector usually leads, as it tends 
to house the institutional 
infrastructure for SRSP.  
International actors will provide 
funds and technical assistance. 
Main international actors at 
present are the United  Kingdom 
Department for International 
Development (DFID) and WFP. 
 
3  Cash transfers as long-term support 
The number of LMICs adopting cash transfers as core components of social protection 
systems and the number of programmes that are implemented has been growing and 
continues to grow rapidly (Barrientos 2013). For example, the number of developing 
countries implementing conditional cash transfers (CCTs) more than doubled from 27 in 
2008 to 64 in 2014 (World Bank 2015). Within wider social protection systems, cash 
transfers are generally considered to represent non-contributory, direct and regular (mostly 
monthly or bi-monthly) cash payments to households or individuals, and may be categorised 
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under ‘social assistance’, ‘social transfers’ or ‘social safety nets’.2 They can be implemented 
by government or NGOs, and are usually funded out of general taxation or donor funding. 
Notwithstanding this rapid expansion, programmes in many countries only cover a small 
proportion of the population, offer low benefits, and suffer from weak institutionalisation (ILO 
2017). 
 
3.1 Objective 
Cash transfers offering basic income support as part of social protection systems serve 
various objectives. The prime objective is to protect people against the consequences of 
poverty and vulnerability and to reduce poverty in a direct way (Devereux and Sabates-
Wheeler 2004). A strong body of evidence confirms that cash transfers are indeed a 
powerful mechanism for reducing poverty, increasing consumption and reducing food 
insecurity (Bastagli et al. 2016; DFID 2011). Cash transfers also prove powerful in terms of 
promoting lives and livelihoods in the medium- to long-term future; they have been found to 
improve children’s access to education and health services, and to stimulate savings, asset 
accumulation and agricultural production (Bastagli et al. 2016; Daidone et al. 2016). Cash 
transfers can also lead to greater participation in the local economy, and studies have found 
that cash is often invested in agricultural or entrepreneurial activities (Daidone et al. 2016), 
thereby stimulating local economic growth. Benefits can extend beyond the immediate target 
group, providing impetus to wider objectives of job creation and inclusive economic growth 
(UNDP 2016). 
 
3.2 Modalities 
The mode by which cash transfers are designed and provided can take various forms. The 
most common modalities include: (a) unconditional cash transfers (UCTs), (b) conditional 
cash transfers (CCTs), and (c) public works (PW) programmes. UCTs represent payments 
that are made on a regular basis to programme beneficiaries without the need for 
compliance with further conditions or behaviour change. CCTs are payments that are 
conditional upon compliance with certain behaviours, often linked to children accessing 
health and education services (e.g. getting children immunised or sending them to school). 
Payment may be withheld in part or in full if conditions are not met. PW programmes offer 
cash in return for work by adult members of the household. Payments are linked to the 
amount of work performed, and work is often only available for a limited part of the year. 
Across all developing countries (in terms of the proportion of countries with particular 
interventions), UCTs are most prevalent, followed by PW programmes and then CCTs. In 
2014, 130 countries had at least one UCT, 94 had at least one PW programme and 63 had 
at least one CCT (World Bank 2015). It is difficult to assess their effectiveness from a 
comparative perspective; the evidence base is biased towards CCTs and only a limited 
number of studies directly compare the use of conditional versus unconditional transfers 
(Bastagli et al. 2016). Evidence shows that CCTs have positive impacts, particularly on 
education and health service uptake, but so do UCTs, and there is no conclusive evidence to 
suggest that CCTs are more effective than UCTs (Mishra 2017).  
 
It is widely acknowledged that CCTs should not be implemented in contexts with lack of 
quality services (ibid.). There are no studies that compare PW programmes with either UCTs 
or CCTs in terms of their relative effectiveness or impact on outcomes such as poverty 
reduction or improving food security. It is also now widely acknowledged that gender 
dimensions should receive close attention in decisions on programme design and delivery. 
Particularly for CCTs and PW programmes, gendered patterns of work and care mean that 
women often bear the brunt of the additional unpaid and paid work requirements (Razavi 
2007). 
                                                          
2  Note that these are wider categories as they can also include in-kind payments such as school feeding or indirect 
payments such as tuition waivers or subsidies. 
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An emerging trend within all cash transfer programmes is to ensure greater linkages with 
complementary services. These efforts emerge from the acknowledgement that while cash 
transfers lead to many positive changes, they also fall short in achieving positive impacts in 
key areas such as malnutrition, health and education outcomes (Roelen et al. 2017). So-
called ‘cash plus’ programmes recognise the limitations of cash alone and offer linkages to 
other services, either by integrating them into cash transfer programmes (such as providing 
behaviour change communication or psychosocial support) or by putting mechanisms in 
place for linking up with existing sectoral services (such as through referral mechanisms) 
(ibid.). Examples include the Livelihood Empowerment Against Poverty (LEAP) programme 
in Ghana and the Integrated Nutrition and Social Cash Transfer (IN-SCT) pilot in Ethiopia. 
 
3.3 Targeting 
Cash transfers in LMICs are almost always targeted in order to ensure that scarce resources 
lead to the largest impact (Coady, Grosh and Hoddinott 2004). Targeting may be more 
generous in nature to ensure that cash transfers cover a larger group of vulnerable 
beneficiaries, or more stringently applied in order to direct maximum resources to those most 
in need. Decisions about who to target and how are often (although not solely) informed by 
resource constraints, and aim to balance so-called ‘inclusion’ and ‘exclusion’ errors.3 The 
inclusion error refers to those benefiting from a cash transfer programme without being in 
need; the exclusion error refers to those in need but excluded from the programme. While 
both errors are to be minimised, in practice they are subject to a trade-off; smaller inclusion 
errors tend to go at the expense of greater exclusion and vice versa (Devereux et al. 2015). 
 
Minimising targeting errors comes at a cost. These include direct administrative costs but 
also private costs (e.g. transport costs for obtaining documents to verify eligibility), social 
costs (e.g. community tension or jealousy), psychosocial costs (e.g. stigma as a result of 
being singled out), political costs (e.g. loss of political support), and incentive-based costs 
(e.g. altering behaviour to remain eligible) (Coady et al. 2004; Devereux et al. 2015). 
 
Targeting can be done in a variety of ways. In developing countries, the most common 
methods include the following (based on Coady et al. 2004; Devereux et al. 2015): 
 
 Geographical targeting: This method targets geographical areas with high levels of 
poverty and vulnerability. It is a fairly simple method with low administrative costs but 
often goes hand-in-hand with high targeting errors. 
 Categorical targeting: This method targets demographic groups that have a higher risk 
of poverty or are considered particularly vulnerable, such as children, older people and 
people living with disabilities. This method tends to be slightly more accurate than 
geographical targeting but still relatively simple. Categorical targeting is a popular 
method, particularly in combination with other methods. 
 Proxy means-testing (PMT): This method uses observable characteristics to obtain a 
score that proxies the available resources at household level. Commonly included 
indicators are housing materials, ownership of durable goods, and educational 
attainment of household members. The use of this method expanded rapidly in the late 
1990s and early 2000s, with many CCTs adopting it as their targeting method of 
choice. It is considered to be more accurate than geographical or categorical targeting4 
but is more demanding in terms of data and administrative capacity.  
                                                          
3  Political considerations may also come into play in reference to targeting decisions (Devereux et al. 2015). 
4  Recent research challenges the commonly held assumption that proxy means testing is more accurate than simpler 
methods such as geographic and categorical targeting, particularly when gauged against their respective administrative 
costs (White 2017). 
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 Community-based targeting: This method asks the community to identify the most 
vulnerable and those eligible for cash transfers. This often involves a group of 
community representatives or elders using their local knowledge to inform decisions 
about who is to benefit from the cash transfers. As most of the community 
mechanisms work on a voluntary basis, administrative costs are low. Results are 
mixed in terms of accuracy and the potential for incurring social costs is relatively high. 
 Self-targeting: This method relies on programme design for ensuring that only the most 
vulnerable and those in need benefit from the programme. It does so by offering low 
transfer levels or making it difficult to obtain transfers. It is most commonly used in PW 
programmes, such as by offering low wages for labour-intensive work. While 
considered effective, there may be considerable social and psychosocial costs 
associated with self-targeting (White 2017). 
 
Despite high levels of accuracy, verified means-testing is not often used in LMICs due to 
high demands on data, and administrative capacity for verifying those data (Coady et al. 
2004). A combination of methods is commonly used, such as geographical or categorical 
targeting with PMT or community-based targeting, or community-based targeting followed by 
PMT (Devereux et al. 2015). It is important to note that there is no such thing as perfect 
targeting; rather, it is about finding a balance between acceptable levels of inclusion and 
exclusion errors against the administrative and other costs of doing so.  
 
Beyond the technicalities of targeting, cash transfers and other forms of social assistance 
are subject to the longstanding debate about universality, and the extent to which transfers 
should be distributed to narrowly targeted groups or populations at large. Advocates of 
targeting emphasise the importance of redistribution, particularly in contexts of limited 
resources and equity (Devereux 2016). Proponents of universal benefits ground their 
arguments in the principle of equality, and highlight issues of paternalism, exclusion, and 
stigma as problematic features of targeting (ibid.). Arguments in favour of universality have 
gained more prominence in recent years with the emergence of the Social Protection Floor 
(SPF) and with universal basic income (UBI) and basic income grant (BIG) policy initiatives 
being piloted across high- and middle-income countries. Some countries have indeed moved 
from targeted to more universal programmes, such as in Uganda, where the old age pension 
was recently expanded to all people over 65 years of age. In many low-income countries, 
however, cash transfers remain targeted at the poorest and most vulnerable groups.  
 
3.4 Delivery 
Delivery mechanisms have changed considerably in recent years, with many programmes 
having shifted from physical payments to more technology-driven approaches, such as e-
payments by mobile phone or smart cards. The use of technology has given rise to the 
involvement of private partners in delivery of cash, representing the main area in social 
assistance within which the private sector is involved. Potential benefits from the use of 
technology from a supply-side perspective include lower delivery costs and reduced risks of 
corruption. From the beneficiaries’ perspective, e-payments can improve accessibility to and 
flexibility of transfer payments (Emmett 2012). Potential downsides include the need for 
strong financial and regulatory frameworks, high upfront investments for setting up systems, 
and low accessibility for beneficiaries that struggle with the use of technology or live in areas 
with low signal or few agents able to process payments. Technology-enhanced payments 
are generally considered to make payments more efficient, yet at the same time there is 
strong acknowledgement that downsides should not be overlooked and that practical 
implementation of technology-enhanced payments comes with pitfalls (Del Ninno et al. 
2012).  
 
Various considerations need to be taken into account when deciding about an appropriate 
mode of delivery (World Bank 2012): (a) frequency, variability and duration of transfer 
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payments, with longer-term and more complex programmes requiring more sophisticated 
systems but also standing to benefit more from the use of technology; (b) local capacity of 
distributing agencies, as the ability to distribute cash consistently is key to efficient 
payments; (c) beneficiaries’ financial literacy and exposure to financial institutions, with the 
potential to include a financial education component within the programme to facilitate e-
payments; and (d) remoteness, with the use of more mobile mechanisms (such as mobile 
banks or cell phones) being more appropriate in remote areas. 
 
Regardless of payment modality, efficient delivery of payments is crucial for achieving 
positive impact. These include regularity of payment, and length of exposure to payments 
(Bastagli et al. 2016). Irregular and unpredictable payments and short periods of receipt 
greatly undermine the ability of cash transfers to achieve positive change. Transfer size also 
plays a crucial role; impacts are considerably smaller when transfer amounts are small 
(Bastagli et al. 2016; Daidone et al. 2016). The value of transfers is often based on a 
combination of considerations, including average consumption of the target group, the 
poverty line and average distance to the poverty line (poverty gap), and available budget. A 
review of cash transfers in sub-Saharan Africa found that transfer sizes varied between 10 
per cent and 30 per cent of beneficiary households’ per capita consumption (Daidone et al. 
2016). A considerable problem in many countries is that transfer sizes are not regularly 
adjusted in line with inflation, meaning that the real value of transfers falls over time.  
 
3.5 Main international players 
The expansion of cash transfers in the past decade has gone hand-in-hand with an increase 
in international actors (and more diverse actors) aiming to support or influence the design 
and implementation of such programmes. We limit ourselves to discussing the role of 
international organisations that have played key roles in shaping and influencing cash 
transfers in the past 5–10 years (and often before that time).5  
 
The World Bank has long promoted cash transfers under the umbrella of social safety nets. 
Social safety nets are considered to denote ‘non-contributory measures designed to provide 
regular and predictable support to poor and vulnerable people’ (World Bank 2015: 7), which 
includes cash transfers, in-kind transfers such as school feeding, and indirect transfers such 
as fee waivers. The World Bank has a strong preference in favour of certain instruments, 
such as CCTs. It has been (and remains) influential in shaping the design and 
implementation of cash transfers in LMICs. 
 
The ILO is arguably the most longstanding player in the field of social protection, initially by 
advocating for social security for formal workers and more recently as leaders on the SPF 
(ILO 2016). The ILO takes a strong rights-based approach, advocating for universal access 
to social protection for those who need it. Cash transfers are a key component within the 
rights-based approach and the SPF, particularly in ensuring a basic level of income security 
for children and older people.  
 
UNICEF became a strong advocate for and supporter of cash transfers in the early 2000s. 
UNICEF is primarily focused on children but also takes a family-focused approach, 
emphasising the interaction between social and economic vulnerabilities and the need to 
reach the most vulnerable and marginalised groups (UNICEF 2012). UNICEF’s role in 
supporting social protection and cash transfers has expanded rapidly over the years, having 
provided a strong push for UCTs and, more recently, becoming instrumental in linking cash 
transfers with complementary services and supporting a ‘systems approach’. 
 
                                                          
5  The discussion of main international players and their approaches is informed by Devereux and Roelen (2016).  
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The FAO is a fairly recent actor in the field of social protection and cash transfers, 
particularly stepping in to strengthen the links with food security and nutrition (FAO 2017). Its 
main focus is on people living in poverty in rural areas, and much of its role in relation to 
cash transfers has revolved around investigating linkages with agricultural production and 
resilience, and building the evidence base on the impact of cash transfers on agriculture, 
local markets and food security. 
 
 
4   Cash transfers as humanitarian response 
In recent years there has been a significant international drive to increase the proportion of 
humanitarian assistance provided through cash transfers (also referred to as cash-based 
transfers (CBTs)). This is reflected in commitments such as the Grand Bargain (Agenda for 
Humanity 2016) and World Humanitarian Summit (World Humanitarian Summit 2016), and 
backed by ambitious targets from key implementers. Cash transfers are becoming an 
important tool of choice for humanitarian responders as it is seen to be an efficient and 
effective mechanism when appropriately applied. In terms of overall humanitarian spend, the 
amount allocated to cash transfers remains small. However, it is growing, from around 6 per 
cent of international humanitarian aid in 2015 (approximately US$1.9bn) (Lattimer, Parrish 
and Spencer 2016; Development Initiatives 2017) to 10 per cent of overall humanitarian 
spend in 2016 (US$2.8bn out of US$27.3bn) (Abell et al. 2018). 
 
4.1 Objective 
Cash transfers or CBTs (which include vouchers) are a modality as part of humanitarian 
actions that aim to protect lives and livelihoods, alleviate suffering, and maintain dignity 
before, during, and in the aftermath of shocks. This form of support is rooted in the 
humanitarian principles of humanity, impartiality, neutrality, and independence (The Sphere 
Project 2011). CBTs, as with other forms of assistance in emergencies, are designed to 
address acute or unanticipated need. This includes when national government capacity is 
exceeded, or when governments are unwilling to act or are party to the crisis. International 
standards (such as the Sphere Standards, Minimum Expenditure Basket (MEB) and SMEB) 
define the parameters for use of cash transfers in humanitarian response, though their 
application varies based on context (The Sphere Project 2011; CaLP 2017).  
 
4.2 Modalities 
As a modality, CBTs in humanitarian settings refer to the provision of monetary assistance in 
the form of cash or vouchers (which serve as a proxy for cash). Other modalities of 
assistance include food and non-food items (NFIs) for needs such as water and sanitation, 
shelter, agriculture, and education.  
 
In line with use of cash transfers in social protection settings, humanitarian cash transfers 
can be unconditional or conditional. Likewise, cash transfers can be restricted or 
unrestricted, meaning that beneficiaries can only use the transfers on a limited set of items, 
or without restriction. Vouchers constitute restricted transfers by design, as they can only be 
redeemed on pre-approved items with chosen retailers. Depending on the circumstances, 
cash transfers may be used on their own or in conjunction with other modalities such as food 
(a ‘mixed-modality basket’) (CaLP 2017).  
 
Two types of cash transfers are being used at a smaller scale in humanitarian responses, 
especially as they become more protracted. Multi-purpose cash grants are defined as ‘a 
transfer (either regular or one-off) corresponding to the amount of money a household needs 
to cover, fully or partially, a set of basic and/or recovery needs’ (CaLP 2017: 6). They are 
unrestricted transfers, and are used within different sectors or clusters (e.g. food and 
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nutrition) or across them (e.g. food, water and sanitation, shelter). This is not to be confused 
with ‘cash plus’, which refers to linking cash transfers to other sectors and services to help 
achieve greater impact – again used occasionally in humanitarian settings (ibid.). 
 
Three essential preconditions for cash transfers – in humanitarian settings and elsewhere – 
include accessible markets (i.e. where the issue is one of access not availability), functioning 
cash infrastructure, and sufficient security (for staff and beneficiaries, as well as anti-fraud 
measures), for which assessments need to be undertaken (WFP 2014; Juillard 2016). 
Households may also be eligible to receive support from multiple interventions 
simultaneously that may have different rationales and modalities (e.g. health, education, 
agriculture, etc.). As with in-kind transfers, gender affects decisions about which household 
member is registered, which service delivery method is utilised, locations for distributions, 
how feedback and accountability is designed, and how monitoring and evaluation is 
undertaken. 
 
Many organisations come with preconceived notions of either the positive or negative 
aspects of CBTs versus in-kind support. Different types of transfers pose different risks for 
staff, beneficiaries and partners, and to agency reputation. Where market systems function, 
or can be supported to function, CBTs (including vouchers) can be used to boost beneficiary 
dignity and purchasing power, stimulate markets (by increasing the volume of trade and 
number of suppliers), and create multiplier effects, as well as increasing programme cost 
efficiency.6 However, the ‘cash first’ principle does not mean ‘cash always’, and initial and 
ongoing assessments and monitoring (of market functionality, infrastructure, security, and 
beneficiary satisfaction) are crucial to ensure the right modality is utilised, whether cash or 
in-kind, and to monitor the effects on markets and recipients. Risks can include disrupted 
interpersonal dynamics within a household, negative secondary market impacts, insecurity, 
theft, corruption and fraud, and lack of capacity or knowledge of the implementing partner. In 
humanitarian settings, especially post-shock, there may not be the infrastructure to 
implement CBTs, or the costs may be prohibitive. Lastly, various factors need to be taken 
into account, including the complexities of scaling a programme, changing conditions 
following a shock (towards stability or further fragility), and seasonality (as supply and prices 
can vary between harvest and lean seasons, or transport disrupted during the rainy season) 
(The Sphere Project 2011). Combinations of cash and in-kind support can be considered, as 
well as switching between the two as and when conditions change. 
 
Notwithstanding the above, CBTs have been implemented for some time in post-disaster 
and fragile settings, with a high degree of evaluation and evidence generation, all of which 
indicates that the risks involved are not dissimilar to or much greater than the risks of in-kind 
transfers (Gordon 2015). What can differ are stakeholder perceptions of risk, based on 
context, experience, and broader policy restrictions. Over-reliance on ‘tried-and-tested’ 
methods, or under-estimation of risks deemed to be familiar, can lead decision makers and 
managers to inherently favour one transfer modality over another (Bailey and Levine 2015). 
Broader issues such as donor policy (including anti-terrorism/money-laundering restrictions), 
institutional culture, and concern about the diminishing roles of established actors in 
humanitarian assistance, can also influence decision making processes. This can, in some 
cases, lead to a lower risk tolerance for cash compared to in-kind assistance (Hoffman et al. 
2010; Abell et al. 2018). Perhaps most pertinently, there are questions over whether 
beneficiaries will use unconditional cash for ‘its intended purpose’. In practice, evaluations 
show that recipients spend most of the cash on essentials (e.g. food, water, shelter), and 
that in-kind transfers are as likely to be misused as CBTs. In sum, evidence suggests that 
cash transfers and in-kind programming present broadly similar risks, and should be held to 
similar standards (Gordon 2015). The surge in use of CBTs – in overall terms and by almost 
                                                          
6  Multiple country-based case studies to attest to this can be found on the CaLP website and on the website of the 
Overseas Development Institute (ODI). 
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all of the principal humanitarian actors – shows that these perceived and actual risks and 
barriers are being overcome.7  
 
4.3 Targeting 
Targeting vulnerable people in emergencies focuses on two main aspects – defining target 
groups, and individuals or households within those target groups. This is often achieved 
firstly through geographic targeting (e.g. administrative, economic or livelihood zones with 
high concentrations of crisis-affected people, cross-referenced with macro-data on food 
production, malnutrition, or poverty) followed by household or individual targeting. Household 
or individual targeting is based on common mechanisms such as: (a) administrative 
targeting, where households or individuals are selected by external actors (e.g. agencies, 
government ministries, centres or clinics) using standard observable criteria and indicators 
(using methods such as PMT); (b) community-based targeting, where households or 
individuals are selected with the participation of community members, traditional or religious 
leaders, committees or local authorities, through criteria developed with the participation of 
the communities; and (c) self-targeting/ selection, where the individuals put themselves 
forward for assistance – sometimes according to externally imposed criteria, other times 
purely through self-identification. Different eligibility criteria can be used, including household 
size and economy, asset ownership, land size, food stocks (current and historic), levels of 
malnutrition, and enrolment in other programmes.  
 
The use of targeting methods varies. Unsurprisingly – as is the case for targeting in 
development contexts – the more precise and objectively verifiable the criteria, the more 
straightforward the identification of beneficiaries, with fewer targeting errors. However, also 
unsurprisingly, these methods tend to be more time-consuming and costly, and not always 
feasible – especially in fast-onset humanitarian responses. There may be potential for more 
refined methodologies in slow-onset crises, if funding is available. As in all contexts, 
compounded in humanitarian settings by the information and capacity constraints at play, 
errors inevitably occur, and there is a balance to be struck between inclusion and exclusion 
errors, where the former can be wasteful and disruptive and the latter can be potentially life 
threatening (WFP 2006). Beneficiary participation is a key part of humanitarian 
accountability, therefore geographic targeting followed by community-based targeting is 
frequently used for slow-onset crises, though in fast-onset crises and conflicts, community 
participation can be limited (WFP 2006; Burns et al. 2011). 
 
There are a few key differences to keep in mind when it comes to targeting of cash transfers 
in development settings. As noted, humanitarian responses are designed to meet acute or 
transitory shock-based need. Therefore, they generally need to be quick, cheap, and up to 
date, whereas targeting for multi-year social protection programmes tends to be a longer, 
more expensive and thorough exercise that is updated over time. Likewise, poverty does not 
always equal vulnerability; or, to put it another way, poverty-based targeting can tend 
towards economic vulnerability to the exclusion of vulnerability to (mostly covariate) shocks. 
As shocks can affect rich and poor households alike, while social protection programmes 
tend to focus on reaching the poorest of the poor, (re)targeting can be required to 
understand who is most in need following a shock (Kukrety 2016). 
 
4.4 Delivery  
As CaLP notes, delivery agents for cash transfers in humanitarian emergencies include 
governments, aid agencies, banks, post offices, mobile phone companies, microfinance 
                                                          
7  Incidentally, the largest documented case of fraud in a humanitarian programme providing cash was in the United 
States in the wake of hurricanes Rita and Katrina, when US$1bn out of a total of US$6bn provided by the Federal 
Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) through the Individuals and Households Programme was estimated to be 
fraudulent from bogus claims and double registration (Gordon 2015).  
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companies, security companies and local traders. Delivery mechanisms include the direct 
delivery of cash or vouchers (by an agency or a sub-contracted party), or indirect delivery 
through payments at banks or post office branches (with or without using bank accounts), 
and into bank accounts or e-wallets accessed using smart cards, automated teller machines 
(ATMs), point of sale (PoS) devices or mobile phone technologies (ODI 2015). Insecure 
conditions sometimes require an indirect delivery approach (e.g. only through service 
providers) although approaches are still highly variable (Hoffman et al. 2010).  
 
The choice of delivery mechanism requires an assessment of options and consultation with 
recipients, weighing up different costs (e.g. delivery, set-up, staff time, transport, training, 
administration, security), as well as efficiency and effectiveness (e.g. timeliness, reliability, 
transparency, flexibility, beneficiary access, financial control, etc.).  
 
A notable key difference in relation to the delivery of cash transfers within humanitarian 
versus development settings is the establishment of the transfer value. Humanitarian 
responses follow international standards on a needs-based approach, and there is a 
tendency to cover a large percentage of overall needs in light of time constraints and the 
effect of crises on vulnerable households. Commonly used methods for establishing transfer 
values in humanitarian settings include the MEB and SMEB (UNHCR 2015). These take into 
account the cash value of essential items by sector (or across sectors) that a household 
needs for a month. These needs are based on international humanitarian and human rights 
law as well as the Sphere Standards, including the right to food, drinking water, soap, 
clothing, shelter, life-saving medical care, essential non-food items, contagious disease 
prevention, and education. Once the items a household needs are costed for a month, this is 
then multiplied by the number of months for the response.8 In practice, this is balanced 
against contextual constraints – not least available funding (this can be when the SMEB is 
used).9 The strength of the MEB/ SMEB process is that it standardises the amounts provided 
by different actors in a sector in any given response, in a context of imperfect data, in a 
comparable manner (CaLP 2017).  
 
4.5 Main international players 
The theoretical chain of response to crises sees communities as first responders, supported 
by local and national government, with international actors coming as last resort, and at the 
request of the affected country or region. In practice, the international humanitarian 
community has often been the first line of response (after communities themselves), though 
this is slowly changing.  
 
The main players in humanitarian CBTs include UN agencies, national and international 
NGOs, the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IFRC) 
movement, and donors. National governments coordinate crisis response through their 
disaster risk management (DRM) departments, which are often housed under the office of 
the president or vice president, ministry of (civil) defence, or in some cases have their own 
ministry. Generally, the UN cluster system is followed, with clusters co-chaired by an 
international actor and relevant line ministry or department.  
 
In terms of elaborating on the role of main players, it should be noted that the tracking of 
CBT humanitarian expenditure is currently hampered by the fact that there is a lack of 
                                                          
8  For example, for food security, the cost of providing a minimum kilocalorie requirement per person (2,100 kcal), per 
month (30 days), multiplied by the average number of people in the household (e.g. 6) is established to provide a dollar 
value for cash transfers. The SMEB may include the 2,100 kcal requirement but remove some nutritional components 
to reduce costs. 
9  For a good example, see the process followed in Lebanon (El Khoury and Hajal 2016).  
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common databases, indicators, reporting requirements and agreement on what constitutes 
humanitarian CBT, as noted by a series of global studies (ODI 2015; Lattimer et al. 2016; 
Development Initiatives 2017; Abell et al. 2018). This makes it hard to indicate who are the 
largest CBT providers in absolute terms, or as a percentage of their overall operations, 
Nevertheless, we elaborate on some of the main actors based on current data and 
understanding.  
 
The largest sectors to implement humanitarian CBTs are food security and 
refugees/displacement; hence it is no surprise that WFP and UNHCR are two of the biggest 
providers of cash. WFP is increasingly applying the ‘cash first’ principle in humanitarian 
responses (defined as the active consideration and usage of cash and vouchers as 
modalities wherever appropriate) and sees cash as key to reaching its commitments under 
Sustainable Development Goal (SDG) 2 (Zero Hunger). In 2016, WFP distributed US$880m 
to 14 million beneficiaries, which represented 26 per cent of its total food assistance 
portfolio. In 2017, this increased to $1.3bn covering 19.2 million beneficiaries, 49 per cent 
through unrestricted cash (Rammaciato 2017).  
 
UNHCR comes second, providing US$688m in CBTs in 2016, reaching 2.5 million people 
across 60 operations. UNHCR has committed to double its use of CBTs by 2020. Together, 
WFP and UNHCR accounted for about two-thirds of the total US$2.8bn spent on CBTs as 
part of overall international humanitarian assistance in 2016 (Abell et al. 2018). UNHCR 
uses CBTs for a wide range of purposes, including protection, basic needs, education, 
shelter, and health and livelihoods, with the majority in the form of multi-purpose cash grants 
(UNHCR 2017). UNICEF has also significantly increased its provision of humanitarian CBTs. 
 
Several NGOs made commitments as part of the Grand Bargain to increase their CBT 
provision. World Vision International has committed to deliver 50 per cent of its 
programmes through a multi-sectoral and multi-purpose ‘cash first’ approach by 2020, and 
both Mercy Corps and the International Rescue Committee (IRC) are aiming for 25 per 
cent by 2018 and 2022 respectively (Rammaciato 2017). Other NGO implementers (on a 
country-by-country basis) include Care, Oxfam, Save the Children and ACF. The IFRC has 
also increased its cash transfer programming in emergencies, reaching 505,000 people with 
US$10m million of cash-based assistance in 2016 (IFRC 2018). Since 2010, more than half 
of all IFRC emergency appeals included cash as an element of the response, and in 2016, 
and 85 per cent included some form of cash transfer (Jones 2016). 
 
In terms of donors, the Department for International Development (DFID) has been 
leading advocacy for the use of cash within and beyond emergencies, and co-led the cash 
working group with WFP under the Grand Bargain. DFID has committed to more than double 
its use of cash in crises by 2025 (Rammaciato 2017). Under its global results framework for 
2011–15, it also committed to reaching at least 6 million people with regular social 
protection-focused cash transfers (Independent Commission for Aid Impact (ICAI) 2017). 
The European Civil Protection and Humanitarian Aid Operations (ECHO) aims to deliver 
35 per cent of its humanitarian assistance in the form of CBT in 2017 (in 2016, over half of 
the European Commission's humanitarian food assistance was provided in the form of cash-
based responses (ECHO 2018)). 
 
At national level, several governments have dedicated significant resources for 
humanitarian CBTs in response to shocks. This can come in the form of resources for cash 
transfers, or more commonly through providing the technical and logistical capacity to 
implement cash transfers. While exact figures are not always available, case studies include 
the Philippines, Kenya, Ethiopia, and Turkey. Some national governments provide significant 
cash transfers in response to shocks (e.g. Ethiopia, Pakistan, the Philippines), and many are 
taking an increasingly central role in implementation. 
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Finally, CaLP is not a provider of cash but rather leads on knowledge management and 
normative guidance and capacity strengthening for humanitarian CBTs, drawing on the 
expertise of a wide range of practitioners. It has recently begun preparing its annual The 
State of the World’s Cash report, which alongside the Global Humanitarian Assistance report 
produced by Development Initiatives, aims to provide a comprehensive overview of the use 
of humanitarian cash and act as an advocacy tool. CaLP has more recently begun to provide 
resources on SRSP. 
 
 
5  Cash transfers as part of shock-responsive 
 social protection10 
The notion of ‘shock-responsive social protection’ (SRSP) became popular in the years 
following the global financial, food and fuel crisis in 2008/9, when social protection was used 
to buffer the effects of macroeconomic shocks on poor people in a range of countries (e.g. 
Independent Evaluation Group (IEG) 2012; Bastagli 2014; McCord 2013). More recently, the 
conceptualisation of SRSP has been framed mainly in relation to climate-related shocks and 
disasters and the need to address acute needs. SRSP in this context looks at the interface 
between social protection, humanitarian assistance and DRM (Davies et al. 2009; Kuriakose 
et al. 2013; Oxford Policy Management (OPM) 2015).  
 
5.1 Objective 
In comparison to adaptive social protection or 'climate-smart social protection', SRSP 
focuses on the ability of a social protection system to scale assistance up and down 
following a shock – either by increasing the level of assistance for existing beneficiaries or by 
expanding coverage temporarily to non-beneficiaries affected by the shock. These can 
include different types of covariate shocks, including natural or man-made hazards, as well 
as situations of protracted crises, and also more localised shocks. Fundamentally, then, the 
objective of SRSP is to provide time-delimited consumption support in times of acute need 
and emergency by (a) topping-up regular support for existing social protection beneficiaries, 
(b) expanding coverage to food-insecure households not currently served by a social 
protection programme, and (c) providing household support for small-scale idiosyncratic 
shocks. As a shock-responsive system typically piggybacks on existing social protection 
infrastructure, the modalities, targeting mechanisms and delivery channels are usually, by 
design, the same. 
 
5.2 Modalities 
Cash transfers present the primary modality for provision of support within SRSP, and UCTs 
in particular. Other modalities include vouchers (which can be considered a proxy for cash) 
and food transfers. Due to the requirement of SRSP to respond to a crisis, it is typical for any 
‘conditions’ related to payment to be dropped. This ensures a more rapid response. For 
example, in the Productive Safety Net Programme (PSNP) in Ethiopia, under the business-
as-usual model, households with labour are required to work for cash payments. In a shock-
responsive scenario, the work requirement has, in recent years, been dropped on the 
proviso that people in acute consumption need should not be expected to expend energy on 
public works programmes. This difference can, of course, create some perverse incentives 
at the local level, where humanitarian relief and regular PSNP transfers are not always 
distinguishable; however, the conditions attached to them are.  
 
                                                          
10  This section draws in part on Ulrichs and Sabates-Wheeler (forthcoming). 
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5.3 Targeting 
Targeting under a shock-response scenario is primarily needs/consumption based, as 
determined by national-level indicators of drought or rainfall, or local-level knowledge of 
community-specific shocks. Targeting of cash transfers within SRSP makes use of the 
existing targeting mechanisms and infrastructure in place within national-level social 
protection systems’ cash transfer programmes.  
 
Targeting can be difficult in a rapid-onset crisis, even when national targeting systems and 
relevant infrastructure are in place (e.g. management information systems (MIS), social 
registries and identity (ID) systems). This is due to the length of time between re-targeting 
exercises that takes place in social protection sectors and national ID offices. Social 
registries tend to have outdated data, as they only collect household targeting data every 
three to four years. Furthermore, as highlighted previously, there is sometimes a conflation 
of poverty with vulnerability (i.e. thinking that everyone on a cash transfer programme in a 
shock-prone area should receive humanitarian support, forgetting that better-off households 
may also be vulnerable). This conflation is not necessarily through ignorant programming, 
but simply the easiest rough proxy for need in the face of the imperative to respond rapidly. 
Also, humanitarian resources are limited. 
 
Some programmes, such as the Hunger Safety Net Programme (HSNP) in Kenya, pre-
identify vulnerable households (those located just above beneficiaries in the consumption 
distribution), register them, provide them with bank accounts, etc., so that when a crisis 
occurs, the rollout of payments can be very fast. Of course, there will be exclusion and 
inclusion errors in this approach, but it nonetheless covers (on average) a substantial 
number of households that are vulnerable and therefore in need of humanitarian support. 
 
Where expansion of coverage is required and the population has not been pre-identified as 
vulnerable, then rapid geographic and community-based targeting is the typical method 
used. ‘Quick and dirty’ methods are frequently utilised in crisis response (e.g. community-
based targeting), versus the longer and more costly processes followed for social protection 
systems (e.g. PMT). Ultimately, a combination is required, as part of a larger chain that 
includes sufficient feedback loops to rectify targeting errors, and the ability to update 
databases annually while conforming to national or international data collection protocols (a 
key restraint to updating social registries). 
 
5.4 Delivery 
Crisis response, including in the form of cash transfers, through existing social protection 
systems can be faster and more cost-effective than conventional humanitarian responses. 
When scalable systems are in place, emergency assistance can reach people in a shorter 
period of time. For instance, the HSNP in Kenya is able to deliver emergency assistance 
within 10 days of declaring an emergency.  
 
Cash transfers in SRSP are usually delivered through existing mechanisms within the social 
protection sector. This can be in the form of actual cash, food, bank transfers, or mobile 
money. Humanitarian funds can be channelled through institutional facilities within the social 
protection sector, such as contingency funds, and various risk financing mechanisms. This 
has recently taken place within the PSNP in Ethiopia. 
 
Cash transfers afford particular opportunities for harmonisation of social protection and 
humanitarian systems. Cash provides an opportunity to harmonise delivery due to its 
fungibility. Different actors can channel their humanitarian assistance funds through common 
platforms that use the same targeting and delivery mechanisms. In Jordan, for instance, UN 
agencies and NGOs use one targeting mechanism (the Vulnerability Assessment 
Framework) to identify vulnerable refugees who then receive cash assistance from the same 
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collection point using biometric data as mode of identification (Schimmel 2015). Cash 
thereby facilitates coordination and thus more efficient delivery mechanisms, which reduces 
the fragmentation, duplication and lack of coordination that is often found with in-kind 
humanitarian assistance (Overseas Development Institute and Center for Global 
Development 2015).  
 
5.5 Main international players 
SRSP requires the engagement of multiple sectors to coordinate cash transfers across both 
chronic and acute situations. Most obviously, SRSP straddles the DRM and social protection 
sectors. However, there are differences between the two in terms of mandate and 
implementation capacity. The arrangements for humanitarian assistance – whether through 
the Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC)/United Nations humanitarian system or NGO 
networks – further complicates the task of coordination, implementation and monitoring for 
SRSP (see O’Brien et al. 2018, for more detail).  
 
Many of the institutional players involved in SRSP are the same as those involved in cash 
transfers in social protection and humanitarian contexts. But as discussed above, different 
players will have prominence within different contexts. Where a social protection system is 
non-existent, due to conflict, NGOs, UNHCR and WFP might be the first and primary 
providers. As targeting and other elements of a system are developed, the classic 
humanitarian organisations should begin to work with and facilitate government structures 
(DRM, social protection and welfare ministries) to take on the responsibility for targeting, 
information systems, and delivery. Bilateral and multilateral organisations such as DFID and 
the World Bank will start to provide funding and technical assistance to support these 
systems. The challenge is in the joining up and harmonisation of diverse government sectors 
and international agencies, which perceive themselves to have different mandates.  
 
Within more mature social protection systems, the government should be the primary 
provider of SRSP and play the primary role in coordinating sectors to set up SRSP systems. 
However, even in settings where social protection programmes or systems exist and are 
institutionalised within state structures, they might not yet be flexible enough to adapt in the 
case of a crisis to incorporate additional caseloads (Winder Rossi et al. 2017). Depending on 
the size of the disaster, the response may be deemed beyond the capacity of the national 
authorities, and international appeals may be issued. Of course, the UN takes a central role 
in this. Conflict can increase the need for SRSP while changing the nature of the support 
required and undermining capacity for response. It can affect which actors get involved in 
programme delivery. Currently, the main international actors in SRSP are DFID and WFP. 
The FAO has been active in pushing the debate around SRSP but is not yet active in 
implementation. 
 
 
6 Concluding remarks  
The use of cash transfers has expanded rapidly in the past decade, both in terms of 
providing long-term support and as a mechanism for offering short-term relief for those in 
need. They form an integral component of social protection systems and the response to 
humanitarian crises and shocks, serving objectives of achieving impacts in a wide range of 
developmental outcomes as well as providing immediate relief in times of acute need.  
 
In terms of implementation, there are many overlaps in how cash transfers are targeted and 
delivered across contexts, not least because their use in response to humanitarian crises or 
climatic shocks increasingly aims to build on existing systems. A few notable differences can 
also be observed, mostly as a result of the need for a quick response in crises settings. 
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 Cash transfers tend to be largely unconditional and very short-term, if not one-off 
payments, when implemented as part of a humanitarian response or as part of SRSP.  
 In the absence of strong social registries or pre-identification of vulnerable populations, 
targeting of cash transfers in crisis situations tends to use geographical then 
community-based targeting, particularly in the absence of existing social protection 
systems. There may be potential for more refined methodologies in slow-onset crises. 
 Decisions about cash transfer size are based on different guiding principles. The value 
of cash transfers as part of a humanitarian response is often set using standardised 
measures that stipulate the cost of a minimum set of items needed to survive, such as 
the MEB or SMEB. By contrast, payment amounts of cash transfers as part of social 
protection systems tend to be based on a proportion of household consumption. 
 
While this brief focuses on the use of cash transfers in three settings, social protection and 
humanitarian responses operate as systems, with cash transfers representing only one 
modality out of a range of interventions. It should be noted that in light of the increasing 
acknowledgement of the limitations of cash alone for improving non-material and longer-term 
outcomes (e.g. nutrition), ‘cash plus’ approaches are quickly gaining momentum in social 
protection contexts. A move towards more comprehensive interventions holds important 
implications for implementation – not least the need for resources to offer additional support 
and strong social services to link into. This raises questions about the extent to which ‘cash 
plus’ can be adopted in humanitarian settings or within SRSP frameworks.  
 
We conclude this paper by reflecting on how cash transfers may be aligned across the social 
protection and humanitarian spheres, particularly in relation to SRSP. As noted in the 
introduction, cash transfers as part of social protection may be linked to humanitarian 
support through vertical or horizontal expansion, through the use of administrative 
frameworks to facilitate emergency support, and through integration of humanitarian cash-
based support in long-term social protection programming (Cherrier 2014). Across these 
scenarios, there may be an overlap between social protection caseloads and humanitarian 
caseloads. In contexts of drought-induced food insecurity, for example, where cash transfers 
as part of social protection reach chronically food-insecure people, a shock response may 
consist of top-ups or scale-ups in case of seasonal food insecurity. In these contexts, there 
is potential to link the delivery and targeting systems of humanitarian and social assistance 
in order to maximise existing resources from both sectors. Questions of how to align efforts 
and create greater harmonisation lie at the core of SRSP. Based on evolving experience, the 
most challenging programmatic areas include setting the transfer value, deciding on the 
targeting mechanism, and the use of existing social registries or delivery systems. A 
significant challenge, but one outside the scope of this paper, is how to harmonise a 
primarily food-based humanitarian response with a primarily cash-based social protection 
system. 
 
Transfer values can differ substantially due to programming objectives. Social protection 
programmes often aim to supplement the household economy, with aims ranging from 
consumption smoothing to catalysing wider investments in livelihoods and productive 
sectors; whereas humanitarian transfers follow a needs-based approach aiming to cover all 
requirements for an individual or household for a specific or multiple sectors (e.g. food, or 
food plus shelter), typically for a month. This can lead to large discrepancies in transfer size 
across contexts.  
 
Targeting mechanisms for social protection (such as PMT) tend to focus on economic 
vulnerability without always accounting for vulnerability to shocks or assessing acute food 
insecurity – two key criteria for humanitarian actors (Schnitzer 2016). Furthermore, while 
poverty can correlate strongly with food insecurity, it is not always direct, especially following 
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a shock (e.g. rich and poor households alike can be affected by shocks, especially where 
poverty is relatively flat and the difference between the better-off and worse-off can be 
marginal).  
 
Delivery mechanisms (and connected databases) can differ based on objectives (short-term 
versus longer-term support), geographic area, shock typology, functioning IT structures and 
markets, existing partnerships and agreements, and donor preferences. While social 
protection practitioners tend to favour working with and through government systems, 
humanitarian practitioners frequently employ separate implementation arrangements, in 
coordination with government, to protect the principles of impartiality, neutrality and 
independence.  
 
All of these issues can lead to tensions among beneficiaries and practitioners, especially if 
systems are merged. For beneficiaries, confusion over who has been targeted for what and 
why, and over differences in transfer values between households, can cause disruption and 
resistance. For example, transfer levels may be reduced for existing social protection 
beneficiaries after the shock and its aftermath has subsided. Likewise, at a wider systemic 
level, while one development principle focuses on building national capacity and reducing 
fragmented approaches and systems (one of the potential benefits of SRSP), certain 
humanitarian actors are pointing out that this compromises the humanitarian principles 
around which intervention is built, and could have longer-term negative impacts for the 
impartial, neutral, independent provision of assistance. For example, in the lead-up to the 
World Humanitarian Summit, the ICRC expressed concern over the ‘wrapping of… 
humanitarian action into the wider project of the Sustainable Development Goals’ (ICRC 
2016), and Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF) decided to withdraw from the Summit 
altogether partly due to similar concerns (MSF 2016).  
 
In sum, cash transfers or CBT are now well-established interventions in offering longer-term 
support to poor and vulnerable populations as part of emerging social protection systems 
and providing short-term emergency assistance in humanitarian settings. The potential 
overlap in caseloads and similarities in how transfers are targeted and delivered calls for 
greater harmonisation of efforts. At the same time, some key differences in objectives and 
principles, modes of delivery and understandings of what works best in which context 
represent challenges in harmonisation of efforts. The growing momentum around SRSP is 
an important step in overcoming some of these barriers. 
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